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Couple’s Relative Labor Supply in Intermarriage
* 
 
In this paper the hypothesis that partnerships between immigrants and natives are less 
specialized – in the sense that spouses provide similar working hours per weekday – than 
those between immigrants is tested. The empirical analysis relies on panel data using a two-
limit random effects tobit framework to identify determinants of a gender-neutral 
specialization index. Results indicate that for immigrants intermarriage is indeed related to 
less specialization as is better education and smaller diversion in education between 
spouses. In contrast, children living in the household, as well as being Muslim or Islamic, lead 
to greater specialization. Intermarried immigrants specialize less presumably due to smaller 
comparative advantages resulting from positive assortative mating by education and different 
bargaining positions within the household. Natives, on the other hand, show different 
patterns: for them the likelihood to specialize increases with intermarriage. This might also 
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* I am grateful for insightful comments and helpful suggestions by Silke Anger, Tanika Chakraborty, 
Matthias Schonlau and Klaus F. Zimmermann. This paper contributes to the project on Ethnic Diversity 
and Labor Market Success in the DFG-Priority Program Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labor Markets 
(Flexibilisierungspotenziale bei heterogenen Arbeitsmärkten). 1 Introduction
Marriages between immigrants and natives, here termed `intermarriage', is
often viewed as indicator of social proximity and possibly a driving factor
of individual economic success. Being intermarried seems to signal greater
commitment and better integration in the host country. On average, inter-
married immigrants tend to have better education, are more likely to work
in high-qualied jobs as well as earn more than singles and immigrants who
live with other immigrants.
The literature predominately focuses on patterns and determinants of in-
termarriage. Accordingly, structural characteristics of the marriage market,
such as availability of potential partners within the own ethnic group, inter-
ference of third parties, personal characteristics including age at immigration,
years elapsed in the country and, most prominent, education are among the
most important factors.
Starting early in the 21st century, researchers have increasingly focused on
intermarriages' potential eects on economic outcomes. Thus, intermarriage
is related to economic success in terms of immigrants' wages in the United
States, Australia, and France, as well as to employment and self-employment
rates of U.S. immigrants.1 However, little is known about what happens
within the household and in particular how intermarried couples dier from
immigrant and native couples with respect to the division of labor.2
The aim of this paper is to ll this gap by analyzing dierences in rel-
ative labor supply of intermarried couples in comparison to immigrant and
native couples, and testing whether they coincide with dierences in part-
ners' self-assessed bargaining power. In particular, the hypothesis whether
intermarried couples are less specialized than immigrant or native couples
is tested. This could be due to (a) smaller comparative advantages induced
by positive assortative mating by education which leads to more similar ed-
ucation and productivity levels of partners, and/or due to (b) dierences
in partners' perceived bargaining position as proxied by one's inuence on
nancial and income decisions.
The decision on how much to work relative to the partner depends, among
1For the United States see Kantarevic (2004), for Australia Meng and Gregory (2005),
and for France Meng and Meurs (2009). Dribe and Lundh (2008) and Gevrek (2009)
address similar questions regarding immigrants in Sweden and the Netherlands, whereas
Furtado and Theodopoulos (2009a) and (2007b), and Georgarakos and Tatsiramos (2009)
consider employment and self-employment rates of U.S. immigrants.
2Some studies, for instance by Basilio, Bauer, and Sinning (2009) and other studies
cited therein, investigate the labor market behavior of immigrants in a family context
with particular interest in the so-called \family investment hypothesis".
2other factors, on the expected gains from specialization and the bargaining
strength of each spouse. If expected gains are low, less specialization is
optimal. Plus, if bargaining strength is high more labor supply is expected,
where if bargaining position is weak, fewer labor market hours are provided.
Comparing years of schooling, similarities in education, and other per-
sonal characteristics such as the so-called `big ve' personality traits indi-
cates that immigrants in intermarriage dier from those in immigrant part-
nerships. Dierences in self-reported bargaining power regarding nancial
decisions also become apparent.
The empirical analysis builds on panel data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), which oer the possibility to incorporate unob-
served, time-invariant factors and various individual's and couple's charac-
teristics.3 A two-limit random eects Tobit model is used to account for
corner solutions in the couple's maximization problem. To allow for possible
endogeneity between intermarriage and relative labor supply, the functional
form assumptions of the Tobit model are successively relaxed, leading to an
instrumental variable estimation. In that an ethnicity-gender ratio similar
to those proposed in previous studies is used as identifying restriction. The
analysis considers cohabiting couples and proposes a gender-neutral special-
ization index to measure to what extent one partner contributes to the mass
of couple's working hours.4
Empirical ndings indicate that intermarriage is, indeed, highly related
to less specialization especially for immigrant men. For immigrant women
this relation also holds but is somewhat weaker. In contrast, natives in inter-
marriage seem to specialize even more if intermarried than in partnerships
with natives. This nding might indicate that natives' view on female labor
force participation diers from that of immigrants, and intermarried natives
adapt to their partners' views in order to mitigate conict potential within
the partnership. In addition, bargaining power of the native partner, es-
pecially the wife, might be better in intermarriage due to better and more
similar education, better outside options and dierent threat points.5
3For further information about this data source see for example Wagner, Frick and
Schupp (2007).
4This approach is motivated by work by Stratton (2005) and Bonke et al. (2008) who
use a similar design to detect dierences in the degree of specialization in household tasks
between married and cohabiting couples, and between couples in the United States and
Denmark respectively.
5This relates to arguments given in models of collective labor supply where bargaining
strength depends on partners' threat points and their outside options. For more informa-
tion about collective labor supply models, its assumptions, tests, and implications see for
instance: Klaveren et al. (2009); Blundell et al. (2007); Attanasio and Lechene (2002);
Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) ; Lundberg and Pollak (1996); Chiappori (1988).
3According to self-reported bargaining strength, intermarried immigrant
men are less likely to be the sole decision maker in the household, whereas in
immigrant households nancial decisions are mostly made by the husband.
For natives and immigrant women no such dierences are found depending
on the origin of the spouse.
In the next section various concepts related to intermarriage are discussed.
In addition, a brief sketch of the theory behind intra-household division of
labor is given. Section 3 then explains the construction of the specializa-
tion index, followed by a summary of denitions and the data description
in Section 4. In Section 5 the empirical results are presented and discussed
including a subsection that contains some robustness checks. The paper
concludes with a summary of results and an outlook for further research.
2 Background
2.1 Determinants of Intermarriage and Its Economic
Implications
Previous research regarding intermarriage primarily focused on patterns and
determinants of intermarriage, that is factors that increase the likelihood to
marry outside the own ethnic group and, in particular, for immigrants to
marry native partners. This strand of literature predominately evolved in
traditional immigration countries such as the United States and Australia,
but is also increasingly prominent in Germany and other European countries
like France, Sweden and the Netherlands.
More recently, studies of economic implications from intermarriage nd
mostly positive eects from native partners for immigrants. Even though
Kantarevic (2004) nds no signicant eect of intermarriage on immigrants'
earnings in the United States once he controls for possible endogeneity, Meng
and Gregory (2005) and Meng and Meurs (2009) do nd positive inuences
on earnings for Australian and French immigrants. They account for se-
lection into intermarriage by using an instrumental variable approach that
serves as the model for the instrument used in this paper. Furtado and
Theodoropoulos (2009a) and (2009b), as well as Georgarakos and Tatsir-
amos (2009) use dierent productivity measures, namely employment status
and self-employment probabilities, also nding positive eects for U.S. im-
migrants. Until now, little is known about such relations for immigrants in
Germany.
Among the most important factors driving marriage choice are structural
constraints in the marriage market such as gender ratios and the availability
4of partners within the own ethnic community (Angrist (2002)). Additionally,
interference of third parties (mainly parents), religious beliefs, socio-economic
status, and cultural and linguistic proximity determine the decision of whom
to marry. These factors, at least partly, explain why some immigrant groups
show a greater tendency toward intermarriage than others. However, indi-
vidual characteristics and personal preferences must not be neglected. In
particular, immigrants are more likely to intermarry if they immigrated at
young ages, spent considerable time in the hosting country, exhibit good lan-
guage skills, and, most importantly, are highly educated (Furtado (2006);
Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010); Chiswick and Houseworth (2008)).
Higher education is among the most prominent factors driving intermar-
riage choice as better educated immigrants are assumed to be less likely to
live in ethnic enclaves and to better adapt to a foreign environment.6 Fur-
thermore, intermarried immigrants are more receptive to `positive assortative
mating by education' according to which people match predominately based
on similarities in education.7 According to Becker (1974), people generally
match based on similar bundles of resources. However, partners do not need
to be identical in each characteristic but can compensate for dierences in one
property by oering greater harmony in other areas. Hence, partners with
heterogeneous ethnic backgrounds tend to be more similar with respect to
education than couples with the same ethnic background (see Chiswick and
Houseworth (2008); Furtado (2006); Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010)).
Moreover, educational institutions usually serve as social platform for meet-
ing potential future spouses.
2.2 Couple's Specialization
The degree of specialization depends, among others, on expected gains and
associated costs from the division of labor within the household. Based on
Becker (1981) and discussed for instance by Bonke et al. (2008), special-
ization and the division of labor are \fundamental principles of economics
and allow for production at lowest possible costs". This principle creates
an advantage of multi person over single person households and results in
household specialization to the extent that one partner focuses mainly on
labor market work whereas the other specializes in home production.
6For a detailed discussion of these eects see Furtado (2006) and Furtado and Theodor-
opoulos (2010).
7Positive assortative mating, that is positive correlation between values of traits of
husbands and wives, also applies to IQ, height, attractiveness, skin color, and ethnic
origin. According to Becker (1985), there is no positive assortative mating by earnings.
However, this nding is discussed controversially in the literature.
5Who specializes in which tasks thereby depends on dierent aspects such
as resource endowment, time availability, ideology and egalitarian views. Ac-
cordingly, members with the most power will do less housework (Hersch and
Stratton (1994)) - thereby `power' can be related to comparative advantages
and better outside options. Hence, those with higher expected earnings, and
therefore higher opportunity costs, will contribute more time to labor market
work. In addition, the least time constrained party will do the house work
whereas the more time constraint partner specializes in labor work. Fur-
thermore, ideology and the importance of individual beliefs regarding gender
roles - keyword: doing gender - also play an important role in the division
of labor (Bittman, England, and Folbre (2003)). Consequently, couples with
more egalitarian views - mainly younger, more liberated people - divide tasks
more equally (Fuwa (2004)).
Putting this in a more formal framework and following the arguments
given in the context of collective labor supply models, couples' utility can be
written as the weighted sum of spouses' individual utilities subject to their
time and budget constraints and incorporating home production. Adopting
the notation given by Klaveren et al. (2009) the couple's maximization prob-
lem then reads as follows:
max Uh = Um + (1   )Uf
s:t: Y = wm(T   lem   whm) + wf(T   lef   whf) + y
H = whm + whf;
0 < lfm;lfm;whm;whf  1:
Uh thereby refers to the household's utility, Um and Uf to husbands and
wives individual utilities. For i 2 fm;fg, lei denotes leisure time, whi hours
worked in the household, wi denotes individual labor earnings, T refers to
the total amount of time available, H to household production, and y is
non-earned income. Allowing  to diverge from one accounts for dierent
productivities in household production between husbands and wives, and 
captures dierences in bargaining strength between spouses. Thereby  cap-
tures, for instance, relative resource endowment, time availability, outside
options and egalitarian views. The higher  the stronger the bargaining po-
sition of the husband relative to his wife, and hence the lower the bargaining
power of the wife.
It is assumed here that the observed labor supply of each spouse is
the optimal solution of this maximization problem given his/her bargain-
6ing strength. According to Klaveren er al. (2009)  depends mainly on labor
market earnings, the number of children living in the household, the age of
the partners, and net weekly non-labor income. However, measuring actual
bargaining power is dicult. Thus, Klaveren et al. (2009) rely mainly on
functional form assumptions underlying the model. Alternative studies, such
as those by L uhrmann and Maurer (2009), as well as Beegle, Frankenberg,
and Thomas (2001) use self-reported information on who has the nal say in
household's decisions. A similar variable is used in this study as robustness
check to depict dierent decision patterns in intermarriage and immigrant
and native marriages.
Independent of the `sexual' division of labor within the couple - meaning
whether the husband or the wife specializes in household labor -, greater gains
from specialization are expected for couples with greater dierences in skills
and abilities (Becker (1981) and (1985)). In particular, smaller dierences in
education will lead to less specialization due to smaller expected gains. In
addition, the degree of specialization may dier with household character-
istics, especially with expected duration of the relationship as proposed by
Stratton (2005). The longer the expected period of specialization, the lower
the present value of costs from changing tasks when the relationship ends,
and the greater the optimal degree of specialization. Consequently, partners
should specialize more if they expect the relationship to last longer.
2.3 Working Hypothesis
Relating these arguments to intermarriage implies that intermarried couples
may be less specialized than immigrant couples for the following reasons:
(1) Intermarried spouses tend to be more similar in education due to as-
sortative mating. Accordingly, intermarried immigrants seem to compensate
for dierences in ethnicity with greater similarity in education (see Chiswick
and Houseworth (2008) for an analysis of U.S. immigrants). This induces
similar productivity levels of partners in intermarriage and hence a smaller
comparative advantage of one partner over the other. This, in turn, reduces
the incentive to specialize and results in less division of labor. In contrast,
immigrant couples are, by denition, ethnically homogeneous and hence may
place less emphasis on similar education. Hence, a higher comparative ad-
vantage of one partner is expected that, among other determinants, will lead
to greater specialization within those partnerships.
(2) Bargaining power in intermarriage might be shifted to the native
partner due to better labor market options. The native partner is more
familiar with the host country's customs, norms, and peculiarities, has a
better knowledge of the local labor market, faces less discrimination based
7on ethnicity, and exhibits better host country specic skills requested by
native employers.
Adding to that, the native spouse might pressure the immigrant partner if
the immigrant's permission of residence depends solely on the marital status
and the immigrant is threatened with expulsion in case of divorce. Resi-
dential status of immigrants - referring to especially foreigners from non-EU
member states - who come to Germany exclusively based on marriage with a
German national, depends principally on the duration of that marital union.
Intermarried bi-national couples need to spend a considerable time `living
their marriage' before the immigrant spouse receives an autonomous right
of residence (eigenst andiges Aufenhaltsrecht). Hence, particularly within the
rst years after immigration, divorce could lead to deportation of the im-
migrant partner. This, in turn, might aect the distribution of bargaining
power within the marriage, spouses' threat points in event of divorce and,
therefore, relative labor supply patterns. However, testing this hypothesis
is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future analyses. What can
and will be tested with the available data are dierences in the self-assessed
power over nancial decisions between intermarried and ethnically homoge-
neous couples.
(3) Furthermore, marriage among religious immigrants, in particular Mus-
lims, are often arranged without giving a \de facto" possibility to divorce.
Consequently, a higher degree of specialization is expected for immigrant and
particularly Muslim couples.
(4) Finally, intermarried couples may be exposed to more conict poten-
tial because of their dierent cultural background, as discussed by St ocker-
Zafari (2007). As shown by Bratter and Eschbach (2006) intermarriage is
also associated with an increase in severe distress for some immigrants in the
United States. Hence, intermarriages may be expected to end earlier than
ethnically homogeneous marriages, which lowers the incentive to specialize
due to higher costs in case of separation.8
Native couples may represent either more traditional or more modern
concepts of division of labor. On the one hand, because they are homo-
geneous with respect to ethnicity, spouses might dier more in educational
attainment than intermarried couples and thus have similar specialization be-
havior as do immigrant couples. On the other hand, natives might have more
egalitarian views with respect to female labor force participation and hence
specialize less. Moreover, getting divorced and re-marry might be more com-
mon among natives than it is in the immigrant's country of origin which may
8see also Kalmijn et al. (2005), who study the relationship between intermarriage and
the risk of divorce in the Netherlands.
8aect the threat point within the partnership. The degree of specialization
in intermarriages can thus dier from or resemble that of native couples.
3 Measure of the Degree of Specialization
The variable of interest is the degree of specialization in labor market work
measured by the index Sit. This index captures whether one partner supplies
the bulk of working hours in period t. It is normalized between zero and
one, with Sit = 0 referring to equal provision of labor market hours, and
Sit = 1 denoting complete specialization of one partner. Thereby hi
t refers to
individual i`s average working hours per weekday in period t, and h
 i
t denotes
















)  2:9 (1)
The shortcoming of this index is that it does not allow for dierentiation
on who specializes - husband or wife - but an increase in Sit clearly indicates
more specialization, whereas a decrease in Sit unambiguously indicates more
similarity in terms of supplied labor hours.10 However, in the majority of
cases observed in the data, husbands provide at least as many hours to labor
market work as does the wife. Results, therefore, do not change qualitatively
when restricting the sample to those cases and can hence be interpreted in the
sense that Sit = 1 refers to cases when the husband is the single breadwinner
in the household.
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) gives information about hours
spent on labor market work, household work, child care, repairs and other
activitie including hobbies. The structure of how this information is gathered
changes slightly over time. For instance, in the rst wave interviewers ask
about time allocation during the workweek, that is Monday to Saturday, and
on Sundays. Later the distinction is made between Monday to Friday, Satur-
day, and Sunday - but only for alternating years. For the years in between,
only weekly hours (Monday to Friday) are surveyed.11 These changes result
in slightly dierent answer schemes and do not allow for direct comparison
of working hours in one year with working hours in the subsequent year. To
circumvent this problem the index is created such that it does not rely on the
absolute but the relative amount of working hours. It is assumed that both
10In case both partners provide zero working hours the ratio is set to missing.
11Furthermore, in 1984, the rst year of the panel, zero working hours are not reported.
9partners make the same multiplicative adjustment  to the dierent question
schemes. Thus, in every alternating year the reported value is hi
t(1 + ) in-
stead of hi





t(1 + ) + h
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However, for even better robustness, estimations are run only for alter-
nating years for which the framing of the questions is identical.
4 Data
4.1 Denitions
Similar to Becker (1974) and various following studies, \marriage" is dened
as sharing the same household. Hence, the underlying sample is restricted to
people who report a partner living in the same household. In the nal sample
about 86 percent of those partnerships refer to formal marriage (\married,
living together"). Marriage is put on the level of partnership or cohabitation,
and partners are addressed as spouses, husbands and wives even though they
might not be formally married.
A partnership between an immigrant and a native is called \intermar-
riage" even though this denition does not generally include marriage be-
tween people with dierent ethnic origins.12 Marital constellations between
two immigrants are called `immigrant marriage'. Note that spouses in im-
migrant marriages need not come from the same country of origin but both
exhibit a migration background. Having a migration background refers to
being born outside of Germany, having non-German citizenship, being born
to parents who do not hold German citizenship or to parents who were not
born in Germany. Marriage between two natives is called \native marriage".
First generation immigrants are dened as people not born in Germany.
Those who are born in Germany but (a) do not hold German citizenship,
or (b) have at least one parent who is not German-born or of non-German
nationality are called second generation immigrants. Both rst and second
generation immigrants are considered assuming that members of the second
generation are not fully assimilated - in the sense of being indistinguishable
from natives - and still dier in their behavior, at least partly, from natives.
Marriage between rst and second generation immigrants is thus treated as
12The term is used more in the sense of \marriage into the native society"
10immigrant marriage, whereas marriage between natives and second genera-
tion immigrants is considered intermarriage.
People are considered only when a current partner is observed and when
they report non-missing working hours. One person can be observed with dif-
ferent partners. It is thereby assumed that former marriages do not inuence
future marriages.
4.2 Sample Construction
The focus of this study lies on the working age population, hence people aged
20 to 65. Apart from the age restriction, people are included independent of
their working status, that is the analysis includes full and part time employed,
as well as occasionally employed people, unemployed and those who are still
enrolled in school.13
Due to dierent questioning schemes in alternating years, only every sec-
ond year is considered. Furthermore, language information and information
about the nationality of the best friend, is be used in the descriptive section
to highlight dierent behavior of those who are intermarried, is available ex-
clusively for 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. Hence, these are the years con-
sidered in this study. 2005 data additionally have the advantage of containing
information about the so-called \big ve" personality traits that give insight
to one's self-perception with respect to openness, agreeableness, conscien-
tiousness, neuroticism/emotional stability, and extraversion. These traits
model the basic structure of all expressions of personality and capture per-
sonality dierences between individuals as expressed through dierent modes
of behavior and experience. They are used in the elds of psychology and so-
ciology to analyze personality structures. The ve factors are constructed out
of information about individual communicative ability, agreeableness, orig-
inality, imaginativeness, work attitudes, attitudes toward worry and stress,
self-restraint, cordiality, as well as the value placed on artistic and aesthetic
experiences measured on a self-report basis. A factor analysis of these re-
sponses is conducted and the data are then grouped into an aggregate value
for each of the ve traits.14 Moreover, for 2005 information on how income is
distributed between spouses and who has the nal say in nancial decisions
13For the unemployed reported hours of work are expected to equal zero. Observations of
people who give inconsistent answers are set to missing. Consequently, people who report
zero weekly working hours while being full-time, part-time or occasionally employed are
not considered, as are people who report positive hours of work while being unemployed.
People may work while being enrolled in school and are still included in the sample.
14For more information about the big ve and its construction in the SOEP see Gerlitz
and Schupp (2005), or Dehne and Schupp (2007).
11is available. This information is used in robustness testing to support the
argument that bargaining power is dierently distributed in intermarriage
than in other marital unions.
4.3 Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 show selected characteristics of men and women who live in
either intermarriage, immigrant or native partnerships. The numbers refer to
two-year observations available between 1997 and 2005. Accordingly, roughly
18 percent of the observations refer to immigrants. Most of the immigrant
men originate from Turkey, Italy, Poland, Greece, and states of former Yu-
goslavia. Immigrant women mainly came from Turkey, Italy, Poland, Russia,
and Greece. Immigrants living in Germany predominately immigrated dur-
ing the `guest worker' recruitment period of the 1950s to 1970s, the family
reunication after the recruitment stop in 1973, as asylum seekers, or as
ethnic Germans after the fall of the Iron Curtain.15
The share of intermarriage out of the total observed partnerships is rela-
tively low, especially among natives. Only 5.0 percent of native women and
4.7 percent of native men report an immigrant partner. Within the immi-
grant population this share is considerably higher: 21.9 percent of immigrant
women and 22.7 percent of immigrant men report living with a native. This
pattern is surly induced not only by preferences but also by group size dif-
ferences: The bigger the own ethnic group and the more potential partners
are available within the own ethnic community, the less likely it becomes to
marry somebody from outside that group. Members of the majority popula-
tion as well as members of big minority groups are thus more likely to marry
a partner with the same ethnic background than members of small ethnic
groups.
Intermarried native men most often live with women from Poland, Italy,
Austria, states formerly belonging to Yugoslavia, Russia, France, the Philip-
pines and Romania. Intermarried native women on the other hand are most
likely to be married to men with Italian, Turkish, Spanish, Greek, Yugosla-
vian or Polish background.16 Hence, these men come mainly from countries
with more paternalistic family structures compared to Germans which might
explain some of the later results.
The majority of immigrant men (63.2 percent of those in intermarriage
and 73.2 percent of those in immigrant partnerships) work on average 8 to 10
15For further information about the historic evolution of immigration to Germany see
for instance Kalter and Granato (2007).
16For a detailed discussion of dierent marital patterns among non-German nationals
see for instance G onzalez-Ferrer (2006), Haug (2006) or Schroedter (2006).
12Table 1: Selected characteristics of men
Immigrant Native
Selected Characteristics Intermarriage Immigrant Intermarriage Native
Marriage Marriage
Number of Obs.1 3,831 (18.1 %) 17,283 (81.9 %)
Working hours per Weekday:
0 11.4% 11.4% 10.3% 9.3%
8-10 63.2% 73.2% 61.3% 61.7%
11-12 17.4% 8.9% 18.9% 19.8%
Marriage Pattern 869 2,962 819 16,464
(22.7%) (77.3%) (4.7%) (95.3%)
Labor Hours 8.5 8.1 8.7 8.8
Partner's Labor Hours 5.4 3.9 4.7 5.4
Household Hours 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
Partner's Household Hours 3.9 4.8 3.9 4.0
Years of Education 12.1 10.5 12.6 12.7
Dierence in Education 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Age at Marriage 29.2 25.4 30.9 28.4
Duration of Marriage 13.2 17.6 13.7 17.3
Years since Immigration 26.2 19.7 / /
Age at Immigration 16.7 23.1 / /
Language2 (German):
Speaking 1.4 2.3 / /
Writing 2.0 2.8 / /
Identity3:
with Germany 2.8 3.1 / /







Risk proclivity5: 5.0 4.3 5.2 5.1
Origin of best friend:
East or West Germany 73.0% 32.4% 90.7% 99.1%
Other country 27.0% 67.6% 9.3% 0.9%
Distribution of income:
Each manages money separately 19.7% 3.9% 17.6% 16.1%
I manage, partner receives portion 4.8% 10.9% 8.4% 3.8%
Partner manages, I receive portion 6.1% 9.4% 4.6% 6.7%
All money shared 59.7% 72.9% 61.2% 63.9%
Part shared, part kept separate 9.6% 2.9% 8.2% 9.6%
Final say in nancial decisions:
Myself 9.0% 16.6% 10.8% 7.1%
Partner 11.3% 6.2% 5.9% 6.1%
Both 79.7% 77.2% 83.3% 86.8%
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
1 Those numbers refer to observations not to individuals, unweighted sample, years 1995 to 2005.
2 Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (=\very good") to 5 (=\very poor")
3 Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (=\strong") to 5 (=\poor")
4 Values are conducted from a factor analysis;
positive/negative***: signicant dierences between those intermarried and those who are not
5 Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (=\highly risk averse") to 10 (=\highly risk loving")
13Table 2: Selected characteristics of women
Immigrant Native
Selected Characteristics Intermarriage Immigrant Intermarriage Native
Marriage Marriage
Number of Obs.1 3,976 (18.2 %) 17,833 (81.8 %)
Working hours per Weekday:
0 34.3% 44.7% 29.8% 27.3%
8-10 28.6% 25.3% 34.5% 32.5%
11-12 4.1% 1.7% 4.8% 5.3%
Marriage Pattern 870 3,106 893 16,490
(21.9%) (78.1%) (5.0%) (95.0%)
Labor Hours 4.5 3.7 5.2 5.2
Partner's Labor Hours 8.7 8.1 8.6 8.9
Household Hours 4.0 4.9 4.0 4.0
Partner's Household Hours 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.4
Years of Education 12.3 10.2 12.2 12.3
Dierence in Education -0.4 -0.3 -0.0 -0.4
Age at Marriage 27.9 22.4 27.8 25.9
Duration of Marriage 13.6 18.0 13.3 17.4
Years since Immigration 21.9 17.9 / /
Age at Immigration 20.2 22.4 / /
Language2 (German):
Speaking 1.5 2.3 / /
Writing 1.9 2.8 / /
Identity3:
with Germany 2.7 3.1 / /







Risk proclivity5: 4.1 3.0 4.1 4.2
Origin of best friend:
East or West Germany 70.1% 32.4% 91.3% 98.9%
Other country 29.9% 67.6% 8.7% 1.1%
Distribution of income:
Each manages money separately 17.6% 4.1% 20.5% 16.0%
I manage, partner receives portion 3.9% 9.2% 6.8% 6.1%
Partner manages, I receive portion 7.9% 11.7% 5.5% 4.1%
All money shared 62.5% 72.0% 59.2% 64.2%
Part shared, part kept separate 8.2% 3.0% 8.1% 9.6%
Final say in nancial decisions:
Myself 6.0% 6.7% 9.3% 5.5%
Partner 11.5% 16.7% 9.3% 6.9%
Both 82.5% 76.6% 81.3% 87.7%
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
1 Those numbers refer to observations not to individuals, unweighted sample, years 1995 to 2005.
2 Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (=\very good") to 5 (=\very poor")
3 Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (=\strong") to 5 (=\poor")
4 Values are conducted from a factor analysis;
positive/negative***: signicant dierences between those intermarried and those who are not
5 Self-reported value measured on a scale from 1 (=\highly risk averse") to 10 (=\highly risk loving")
14hours per weekday. 8.9 percent in immigrant marriages and even 17.4 percent
in intermarriages work slightly more, namely 11 to 12 hours. Among native
men, the share of those working 8 to 10 hours is slightly smaller (61.3 percent
in intermarriage and 61.7 percent in native marriages). However, a greater
share (18.9 percent in intermarriage and 19.8 percent in native partnerships)
works 11 to 12 hours. Among native women 27.3 percent in native marriages
and 29.3 percent in intermarriage report zero working hours. For immigrant
women this share is noticeably bigger, particularly among those who live
with another immigrant: 44.7 percent of immigrant women in immigrant
marriages do not provide any labor hours. Among the intermarried the
share of women reporting zero hours of work is only 34.3 percent which is
noticeably closer to the shares of natives. About one fourth (25.3 percent) of
women in immigrant marriage and up to one third (28.6 percent of immigrant
women in intermarriage, 32.5 percent of women in native marriages and 34.5
percent of intermarried native women) work 8 to 10 hours. Thus, women
in intermarriages tend to work more than those in ethnically homogeneous
partnerships.
On average, native men in intermarriage do not dier much regarding the
presented characteristics from men in native marriages.17 Accordingly, na-
tives show no signicant dierences by type of marriage with respect to their
average labor hours, partner's labor hours, and hours spend on household
tasks - neither by themselves nor by their partners. There is no dierence
in education as measured by years of schooling. And also the gap in educa-
tion between spouses is the same in native partnerships and intermarriages.
There are no statistically signicant dierences in natives` answers to the big
ve and risk proclivity questions. But intermarriages do not last as long as
marriages between natives. With respect to social interaction, the likelihood
of being friends with a non-German person is noticeably higher for men in
intermarriage than for those in native marriages. Furthermore, native men
in intermarriage are more likely to report having the nal say on nancial
decisions than men in native relationships. This suggests more paternalistic
gender roles in marriages between native men and immigrant women than
within native couples, which goes in favor of a better bargaining position of
the native wives compared to the immigrant wives.
There are no statistically relevant dierences between intermarriage and
native marriage for native women with regards to average working hours, the
amount of time that their partners devote to labor market and household
work or women's hours spend on household tasks. However, while average
17This corresponds to ndings by Glowsky (2007) who studies marriage patterns of
German men also using SOEP data.
15years of schooling in intermarriages and native marriages are almost identical,
the dierence in education is not. More precisely, while native women who
live with a native men have about half a year less of education than the native
partner, in intermarriage the educational gap between spouses is completely
negligible. Again, intermarriages tend to end earlier than native partnerships.
And as for native men, answers to the personality traits and risk attitudes
do not dier, while the share of those reporting a best friend who does not
come from West or East Germany is considerably higher among intermarried
women than among those married to a native man. In addition, a higher
percentage reports that each spouse manages his/her income separately in
intermarriage than in partnerships between natives. Moreover, women are
more likely to have the nal say on nancial decisions if they are intermarried.
For immigrants, dierences by marriage type are considerably stronger.
Accordingly, immigrant men in intermarriage work more hours per week-
day than other immigrants. They devote about the same amount of hours
to household tasks in intermarriage as in immigrant marriage, whereas the
native wives spend more time working in the labor market and less time
with household work than the immigrant wives. Furthermore, intermarried
immigrant men have signicantly more education than those in immigrant
partnerships, and the dierence in education between spouses is noticeably
smaller and even insignicant in intermarriage. Moreover, those who live
with natives have spent more years in the hosting country, immigrated at
younger ages, report better linguistic abilities - both with respect to speak-
ing and writing skills - and feel more attached to Germany and are more risk
loving than immigrant men in marriages with other immigrants. In addition,
intermarried immigrant men are more likely to report a best German friend,
and they are, according to their self-assessment, more open and have higher
values of extraversion than men in immigrant marriages - even though men in
immigrant marriages view themselves as more agreeable. A noticeably higher
percentage of immigrant men reports that each spouse manages his/her own
money separately when they are intermarried. And, most strikingly, only 9.0
percent of immigrant men in intermarriage report to have the last word in
nancial decisions, in contrast to 16.6 percent of men in immigrant marriages.
Similar patterns evolve for immigrant women. Those intermarried pro-
vide more hours of labor market work than women in immigrant marriages.
And also the native partners work more than the immigrant spouses. At the
same time they spend less time on household tasks than women in immigrant
partnerships. Immigrant wives with native husbands have considerably more
years of education, although dierences in education between partners are
as big in intermarriages as in immigrant partnerships. As for men, inter-
married immigrant women have spent more time in Germany, immigrated
16at younger ages, report better linguistic prociency and a greater identica-
tion with Germany and less risk averse than women in immigrant marriages.
Furthermore, they are more often friends with Germans and view themselves
as more open and outgoing. 17.6 percent of immigrant women in intermar-
riage report that each spouse manages his/her own money separately, which
contrasts to only 4.1 percent among women in immigrant marriages. Adding
to that, 16.7 percent of women in immigrant partnerships report that the
partner makes the nal decisions on nancial aspects, but only 11.5 percent
of intermarried immigrant women make the same claim.
The descriptive ndings imply that positive assortative matching by edu-
cation is most severe in marriages between immigrant men and native women,
and that bargaining strength of women - as proxied by self-reported power
over nancial decisions - is stronger in intermarriages than in immigrant
marriages.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Two-limit Random Eects Tobit
For the relevant years, 1,130 immigrant men in either intermarriage or im-
migrant partnerships are observed. For them the probability to live in a
household where both partners work increases noticeably with intermarriage.
The corresponding marginal eect on the probability that the index is smaller
than one - recall that an index value of one refers to complete specialization of
one spouse (mostly the husband) - is 0.13 and highly statistically signicant
(Table 3, Column 1). Even though own years of schooling appear insigni-
cant for determining the division of labor, the probability to specialize rises
with each additional year of schooling that the immigrant man achieved more
than his wife. In addition, the probability to specialize increases with im-
migrant's age but not with the age gap between spouses. Interestingly, the
probability to live in a partnership with two working partners increases in the
duration of marriage. However, the magnitude is rather small and there is
no change in the degree of specialization as an intermarriage persists because
the two eects oset each other. Among the most prominent factors deter-
mining the division of labor in the household are children, as indicated by
a highly signicant increase in the probability to specialize if children under
the age of 16 are present in the household. The same holds for Muslim immi-
grants. The chance to live in a fully specialized household rises noticeably if
the immigrant reports to exhibit Islamic beliefs or to be Muslim. Estimates
of language abilities which are measured on a scale from \very good skills"
17(=1) to \very poor abilities" (=5) indicate that those who report to have
better German speaking prociency (which corresponds to a smaller value of
that variable) are more likely to live in dual working households. Speaking
the home country language seems not signicant for determining the division
of labor for immigrant men.18
One of the short-comings of the specialization index is that it does not al-
low the unambiguous determination of who specializes in labor market work
- the husband or the wife. To address this issue, the same regressions are
run for immigrant men who contribute at least as many labor work hours as
their wives. As a consequence, an increase in the index can unambiguously
be interpreted as following more traditional gender roles in the sense that
the husband is the single breadwinner and the wife concentrates on house-
hold tasks. Since the vast majority of cases (about 80 percent) refer to this
category it is not surprising to nd that this restriction does not change esti-
mation results qualitatively - in contrast, the negative relationship between
intermarriage and specialization becomes even more pronounced.19
The SOEP contains information for 1,188 immigrant women living in
partnerships during the relevant years. For these women the likelihood to
live in a fully specialized partnership also decreases in case of intermarriage
(Table 4, Column 1). Hence, those who live with a native husband are more
likely to live in a household where both spouses work. However, the relation-
ship is smaller than for immigrant men and only signicant at the 10 percent
level. While educational attainment is insignicant, older immigrant women
tend to live in more specialized relationships than younger ones supporting
the assumption that younger generations adopt more egalitarian views with
regard to female labor force participation.20 As for immigrant men, there
seems to be no eect from additional years being intermarried, whereas mar-
riage per se slightly increases the likelihood that both spouses work. Again,
children living in the household as well as being Muslim or Islamic increases
the probability of fully specialization drastically. Speaking the German lan-
guage properly decreases this likelihood.
Between 1997 and 2005 a total of 5,874 native men are observed. Among
them, intermarried native men are, in contrast to immigrants, more likely to
live in fully specialized household when they are married to an immigrant wife
(Table 5, Column 1). Accordingly, intermarriage increases the probability to
completely specialize for native men. While more years of education lead
18Writing abilities are not included in the regression despite their availability in the
SOEP because answers to speaking and writing skills are highly correlated and would
induce multicollinearity.
19Estimation results are available upon request.
20This corresponds to arguments given by Fuwa (2004) for example.
18Table 3: Impact of Intermarriage on Specialization - for Immigrant Men
Dep. Var.: RE Tobit1 Tobit1 Logit1, 2 LPM3 IV4
Specialization Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intermarriage 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 1.745***
Education 0.006 0.011** 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.026**
More educ5  Dierence in educ -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.050*** -0.031**
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004* 0.002 -0.009
Older  Dierence in age 0.007* 0.008** 0.006 0.002 0.022**
Duration of marriage 0.005** 0.006*** 0.004 -0.000 0.024**
Duration of intermarriage -0.005* -0.006** -0.007* -0.007** -0.081***
Children younger than 16 -0.128*** -0.146*** -0.090*** -0.049** 0.018
Being Muslim/Islamic -0.123*** -0.213*** -0.202*** -0.172*** -0.166***
Good German language skills -0.030*** -0.026** -0.029** -0.013 0.045
Good skills in language of home country -0.012 -0.028** -0.014 0.007 -0.027
Estimation coecient of the IV on intermarriage variable in rst stage: -0.742***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
Male immigrants aged 20 to 65; Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in immigrant marriages.
Clustered standard errors;  p  0:05,  p  0:01,  p  0:001
1Entries refer to marginal eects on the probability that both spouses work.
2Modied Dep. Var.: = 1 if both spouses work, = 0 if only one partner works.
3Entries refer to estimation coecients using the same modied dep. Var. as in the logit regression
4 IV =
number of opposite sex in the same ethnic group and the federal state
total number of opposite sex in the federal state
5 Implying that this person has more years of schooling than his/her partner.
to less specialization, an increase in the educational gap between partners
increases the incentive to divide tasks and thus increases the probability to
specialize - as does an increase in men's age. As for immigrants, duration of
marriage has no noticeable eect, whereas children seem to be crucial for a
huge part of couple's division of labor.
Finally, the underlying data include observations for 6,047 married na-
tive women. Like for native men, intermarriage increases the probability
to specialize compared to being married to a native man (Table 5, Column
2). In line with ndings for the other subgroups, the probability to com-
pletely specialize is lower for better-educated women, although exhibiting
more education than the spouse does not alter the division of labor. Similar
to immigrant women, older native women tend to live in more specialized
partnerships, whereas being older than the husband increases the probabil-
ity that both partners work. This eect could be explained by arguing that
in traditional families the husband is usually older than the wife. If the wife
is older than the husband, this already expresses more modern perspectives
which are reected also in more modern views on female labor market partici-
pation and a more equal share of labor. Again, duration of marriage seems to
play only a minor role for relative labor supply, whereas children determine
19Table 4: Impact of Intermarriage on Specialization - For Immigrant Women
Dep. Var.: RE Tobit1 Tobit1 Logit1, 2 LPM3 IV4
Specialization Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intermarriage 0.084* 0.059 0.088* 0.094* 0.662*
Education 0.005 0.008* 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.034***
More educ5  Dierence in educ 0.007 0.004 -0.007 -0.018* -0.016
Age -0.007*** -0.005** -0.000 0.006** -0.001
Older  Dierence in age 0.005 0.008 0.003 -0.003 0.002
Duration of marriage 0.004** 0.005** 0.002 -0.001 0.008
Duration of intermarriage -0.007** -0.008*** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.034**
Children younger than 16 -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.103*** -0.063** -0.042
Being Muslim/Islamic -0.079*** -0.150*** -0.141*** -0.109*** -0.076**
Good German language skills -0.066*** -0.079*** -0.065** 0.048*** 0.043***
Good skills in language of home country -0.008 -0.026** -0.010 0.012 0.007
Estimation coecient of the IV on intermarriage variable in rst stage: -0.997***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
Female immigrants aged 20 to 65; Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in immigrant marriages.
Clustered standard errors;  p  0:05,  p  0:01,  p  0:001
1Entries refer to marginal eects on the probability that both spouses work.
2Modied Dep. Var.: = 1 if both spouses work, = 0 if only one partner works.
3Entries refer to estimation coecients using the same modied dep. Var. as in the logit regression
4 IV =
number of opposite sex in the same ethnic group and the federal state
total number of opposite sex in the federal state
5 Implying that this person has more years of schooling than his/her partner.
most of the couple's distribution of labor supply.
Summing up results from the two-limit random eects Tobit regressions,
immigrant men are particularly more prone to more equal labor supply when
intermarried than in marriages with immigrant women. This might be due
to (a) greater assortative mating by education and hence less comparative
advantages in the marriage, and (b) a better bargaining position of native
wives compared to immigrant wives. Specialization also seems less frequent
in marriages between immigrant women and native men than in partnerships
between immigrant women and immigrant men. However, assortative mating
is not so pronounced and the bargaining strength of the immigrant wives
might also not be much dierent in the two types of partnerships.
In contrast, natives specialize more when intermarried than if in native
marriages. Although this might contradict expectations at rst sight, it
might be explained by the fact that (a) native women are often married
to immigrant men who come from mainly paternalistic countries such as
Turkey and Italy. Hence, to mitigate conict potential in the partnership
those women might be willing to compromise on classical gender roles and
thus accept a more traditional allocation of labor in the partnership; and
(b) native men might specialize more when intermarried because of a weaker
20Table 5: Impact of Intermarriage on Specialization - Natives
Dep. Var.: RE Tobit1




More educ5  Dierence in educ -0.022*** -0.004
Age -0.010*** -0.012***
Older  Dierence in age 0.006 0.007**
Duration of marriage 0.001 0.001*
Duration of intermarriage -0.001 0.002
Children younger than 16 -0.152*** -0.152***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
Natives aged 20 to 65; Unbalanced panel, years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
Comparison of those in intermarriage with those in native marriages.
Clustered standard errors;  p  0:05,  p  0:01,  p  0:001
1Entries refer to marginal eects on the probability that both spouses work.
5 Implying that this person has more years of schooling than his/her partner.
bargaining position of immigrant wives compared to native wives.
5.2 Alteration of Estimation Method
One of the main aws of the random eects models is that it does not allow
the unobserved individual factors to correlate with the explanatory variables.
Regarding the question addressed in this study, this is somewhat dissatisfying
as intermarriage choice and the division of labor within the household may
both be aected by unobserved factors such as ambitions, openness to new
cultures and egalitarian views. As discussed in the data section, immigrants
especially dier in their replies to, for example, the big ve questions, de-
pending on whether they are intermarried or live in immigrant partnerships.
Hence, it can be expected that they exhibit dierent characteristics that
might determine both partner choice and relative labor supply. Omitting
such factors will then bias estimation results.
To address this endogeneity issue by using an instrumental variable ap-
proach, it is necessary to show that altering the functional form of the es-
timation model does not aect the empirical results. Tables 3 and 4 show
that these transformations nally lead to the IV estimation. At rst, instead
of the panel Tobit model a simple cross-sectional Tobit is estimated using
clustered standard errors to correct for dependences within individuals. As
shown in Column 2 in each table this does not change results dramatically.
In a next step, a new binary variable is generated which equals one in
21case that both partners work, and zero in case of full specialization. Columns
3 show estimated marginal eects from Logit regressions using this modied
specialization index as dependent variable. The entries report marginal ef-
fects on the probability to live in a dual worker partnership. Again, results
are fairly stable and close to the Tobit results.
As argued by Angrist and Pischke (2008), functional form assumptions
underlying the Logit regression can sometimes be ignored and a simple Lin-
ear Probability Model (LPM) will lead to the same results. This argument
is supported by ndings presented in Columns 4 showing that the Logit
marginal eects are almost identical to the OLS estimates.
In a nal step an IV estimation is proposed to account for the endogene-
ity problem. Thereby an instrument similar to that introduced by Meng and
Gregory (2005) is used which takes into account that the probability to in-
termarry depends to a great amount on the availability of potential partners
and hence the opportunity structure of the marriage market. The instrument
used here is the ratio between the number of members of the opposite sex
within the own ethnic groups in a certain region (in this case the federal
state21) and the total number of members of the opposite sex in that area.
Hence, the smaller that ratio the less likely it is to meet a potential part-
ner from the same ethnic group and the more likely it is to marry someone
from outside the own ethnic community, in particular from the native pop-
ulation. As a consequence, a negative eect of that ratio on the probability
to intermarry is expected.
As shown in the last row of Column 5, this negative relationship is in-
deed detected, as the corresponding estimation coecients of the rst stage
regressions of the 2SLS estimations are negative and highly signicant. Fur-
thermore, the coecients of the intermarriage indicators in the second stage
are still signicant at the same level as in the previous regressions and in-
creased noticeably in size. Assuming that the ratio that serves as instrument
is exogenous and not prone to endogeneity, this nding indicates that in-
termarriage indeed fosters more equal labor supply. The downward bias of
the OLS estimate might thereby result from omitting important factors that
aect both intermarriage choice and the degree of specialization. If, for in-
stance, ambitions increase the probability to nd a native partner but also
increase the likelihood to be the main breadwinner in the family, the OLS
will underestimate the eect of intermarriage on the probability to specialize
if no adequate measure for ambitions is available.
21Ideally a closer regional frame would be preferred but this is not possible with the data
used in this study. Further regional subdivision would reduce the sample size dramatically
which would aect the explanatory power of the results.
22Unfortunately this instrument does not work for natives, as few theories
exist that explain the driving factors for intermarriage. Trying to answer
this question is beyond the scope of this paper but seems crucial for fully un-
derstanding the processes that determine intermarriage choice as a two-sided
decision. But for now, since natives hardly respond dierently depending on
the origin of their partner, for example regarding their big ve personality
traits, omitted variable biases might not be as important for them as it is for
immigrants.
5.3 Robustness Checks
One of the arguments made earlier about why intermarried couples might
behave dierently than ethnically homogeneous couples is that bargaining
power is distributed dierently - presumably more in favor of the native
partner. A rst indicator for that assumption was given in the descriptive
section when two variables were discussed that measure who has the decision
power over income and who has the nal say in nancial decisions. Such
information can be used to proxy bargaining strength.22 Accordingly, inter-
married immigrants are more likely to live in partnerships where nancial
decisions are made by both spouses.
To make this correlation more apparent, simple multinomial Logit re-
gressions are run using those self-reported decision information as dependent
variables and age and education as regressors (Table 6). This is a very sim-
ple specication which does not account for various problems related to, for
instance, endogeneity or measurement errors. But for now the purpose is
merely to visualize some correlations leaving aside causal relations.
Estimation results refer to marginal eects on the probability that a par-
ticular outcome is achieved. They indicate that for immigrant men inter-
marriage is highly correlated with more equal decision making within the
couple. Interestingly, there seems to be no dierences for natives and immi-
grant women. As already foreshadowed in the descriptive section, natives'
behavior seems to be extensively independent of the origin of the spouse.
6 Conclusion
Social interactions are most obviously reected in intermarriage patterns.
Therefore, marriages between members of dierent groups are among the
22Variables similar to these are used by L uhrmann and Maurer (2009), and Beegle et
al. (2001) in order to measure bargaining power in the household.
23Table 6: Correlation between Intermarriage and Decision Power
Dep. Var.: Multinomial Logit
Agreement on Income Immigrant Native
(=1 if \me", =2 if \partner", =3 if \shared") Men Women Men Women
Marginal eect on Prob(outcome=\mainly me")
Intermarriage -0.085** -0.034 0.029** 0.002
Education -0.008** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.013***
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000
Marginal eect on Prob(outcome=\mainly partner")
Intermarriage -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
Education -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.008***
Age 0.001 -0.000 0.001** -0.000
Marginal eect on Prob(outcome=\shared")
Intermarriage 0.094** 0.036 -0.028 -0.006
Education 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.022***
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
Dep. Var.: Multinomial Logit
Final say on nancial decision Immigrant Native
(=1 if \me", =2 if \partner", =3 if \both") Men Women Men Women
Marginal eect on Prob(outcome=\me")
Intermarriage -0.100** 0.002 0.025 0.021
Education -0.002 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007***
Age -0.003** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001***
Marginal eect on Prob(outcome=\partner")
Intermarriage 0.058** -0.024 -0.003 0.019
Education -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011***
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Marginal eect on Prob(outcome=\both")
Intermarriage 0.041 0.022 -0.022 -0.040*
Education 0.014** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018***
Age 0.004** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002***
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
People aged 20 to 65; year 2005 (nancial decision), years 2004 and 2005 (agreement on income)
Entries refer to marginal eects on the probability that the variable takes on the particular outcome.
Clustered standard errors;  p  0:05,  p  0:01,  p  0:001
24crucial factors fostering social and economic harmonization. By that, in-
termarriages serve as indicator of social proximity and are given credit for
individual economic success of immigrants. However, little is known about
the dynamics evolving within the couple, in particular regarding the division
of labor between spouses. This paper therefore aims at lling part of that
gap by analyzing relative labor supply of intermarried couples in comparison
to immigrant and native couples.
The leading arguments that might explain dierences in labor supply be-
havior, especially less specialization in intermarriage, are based on two issues:
First, positive assortative matching by education, that is greater educational
similarity of partners, is more pronounced in intermarriages than in other
marital constellations leading to less comparative advantages and therefore
less incentives to specialize. Second, bargaining positions of spouses might
vary in intermarriages from that in immigrant or native marriages due to dif-
ferent outside options, dierent threat points and other factors determining
bargaining strength.
As already hinted at in the descriptive statistics, the perceived bargain-
ing position of native women in intermarriage is noticeably stronger than of
women in immigrant partnerships. This impression is conrmed by results
from a multinomial Logit regression. Accordingly, intermarried immigrant
men are considerably more likely to decide in cooperation with their native
wives when it comes to nancial aspects and the distribution of income than
immigrant men who live with immigrant women. However, no such dierence
depending on the origin of the partner is found in the data for natives and
immigrant women. Furthermore, assortative mating is most pronounced in
partnerships between native women and immigrant men, which lowers the
incentives to specialize for those couples.
Results of a two-limit random eects Tobit model are also in line with the
hypothesis stated above and regression estimated used to detect dierences
in relative labor supply indicate that intermarried immigrants live in less
specialized partnerships than those in immigrant marriages. This result also
holds when accounting for possible endogeneity of intermarriage in an in-
strumental variable approach. In contrast, natives in intermarriage are more
specialized than those in native marriages possibly indicating less bargaining
power of the immigrant wives and adaption in behavior of native women in
intermarriages.
This analysis is only a rst step on the way to a better understanding
of what makes intermarried couples special and what drives their decisions.
For further research it is of particular interest to detect what determines the
decision to intermarry for natives if, for instance, immigrants are economi-
cally disadvantaged and intermarriages prone to more conicts than ethni-
25cally homogeneous marriages. Moreover, dierences in bargaining strength
of spouses in dierent types of marriage should also be considered in greater
detail.
With increasing globalization and higher mobility of people, it is cru-
cial for multi-national and multi-cultural societies to better understand pro-
cesses that encourage social proximity and acceptance of dierent cultural
backgrounds. Intermarriages are in that context essential as they are the
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